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Non-veridical uses of Japanese expressions of temporal precedenceStefan KaufmannNorthwestern University Joint work in progress with Yukinori Takubo, Kyoto University This paper discusses two Japanese expressions for asserting that an eventuality a precedes another eventuality b: B mae ni A and B-nai uchi ni A (where A and B are clauses referring to a and b); cf. (1). Both expressions are non-veridical in that they do not entail B. This property is shared with English A before B, where it has been studied extensively (Anscombe 1964; Heinämäki 1972, 1974; Valencia et al. 1992; Ogihara 1995; Beaver and Condoravdi 2003). We compare the two Japanese expressions with each other and with before, with special emphasis on the counterfactual and modal implicatures carried by their non-veridical uses.
It is also often observed that English A before B on its non-veridical use supports (i) the implicature that B is or was likely at the time of A; or (ii) the counterfactual implicature if not-A, would (have been) B. In fact, (i) and (ii) are often conflated and treated as different ways of stating the same condition (e.g., Beaver and Condorvadi). They are not equivalent, however: The counterfactual does not require for its truth that B was likely at the time of A. Consider (2), and suppose an accident occurred but was highly unlikely and not foreseeable at the time the speaker got off. Then (2a) is false, but the posterior counterfactual (2b) is true. In fact, (2a) is intuitively more similar to the prior predictive conditional (2c). Thus a counterfactual analysis would make different predictions from a likelihood analysis, and the latter would seem to be more suitable for before.
In Japanese, on the other hand, in the situation described, both (3a) and the counterfactual (4a) are true, whereas (3b), like (2a) and the prior predictive conditional (4b), implies that the danger was imminent when the speaker got off the bus.
Our analysis proceeds from the standard possible-worlds account of English before, which can be adapted to mae-ni fairly straightforwardly. (In doing so, we discuss certain unresolved problems facing Beaver and Condoravdi's implementation). As for B-nai uti ni A, B-nai denotes a state, and uti ni locates A within this state and presupposes that the state is bounded. (The latter is a lexical property commonly found in temporal connectives across languages, which in Japanese distinguishes uti from mama and aida 'during/while'.) This presupposition in turn implies that B is expected to occur, for that is the only way for a state of B's not-occurring to end. This inference, while defeasible, strengthens the meaning from while not-B to before B. It is also the reason why B-nai uti ni A implies that B is/was imminent at the time of A, unlike B mae ni A (also unlike B-nai mama). We conclude with general remarks about related phenomena at the interface between modality and temporal reference, and point out some residual problems which seem to call for a more fundamental rethinking of the technical apparatus than we are proposing in this paper. |
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