Tokens, types, and identity

Identity statements involving the adjective 'same' often allow for both "token-identity" and "type-identity" readings: the sentence 'John drives the same car as Bill does' can either assert that John's car is strictly identical to Bill's car (token-identity), or that John's car is merely of the same make, model and (perhaps) year as Bill's car (type-identity). Previous research has taken this difference to reflect either variation in the way that model-theoretic individuals correspond to real-world individuals, or else variation in the relation that is required to hold between John's car and Bill's car by 'same'. In the first part of this talk, I argue that both the token- and type-identity readings for our previous example require the relation of strict identity to hold amongst John's and Bill's cars. What distinguishes the readings is the nature of these individuals: type-identity readings require that strict identity hold amongst types qua abstract individuals. In the second part of the talk, I turn to the status of NPs containing 'same' with respect to various existential constructions (cf. 'There are the same books on the table today as there were yesterday'), and explore whether my previous proposals concerning the type-/token- distinction can shed any light on these facts.